Abstract This article shows how the visions and practices of DIY (do-it-yourself) maker culture are taken up in China. It analyzes how maker ideals of open-ness, resourcefulness and individual empowerment are formulated in relation to China's project of building a creative society and economy. To demonstrate, Lindtner draws from long-term ethnographic research, including the set-up of China's first hackerspace and the proliferation of hackerspaces, maker events, and partnerships between makers and manufacturers. China's makers are driven to remake what creativity and industrial production mean today, simultaneously exploiting and challenging political rhetoric. By setting up hackerspaces, designing open technologies and starting up businesses, they craft alternative subject positions, for themselves and others. The contribution of this work is three-fold. First, it fills a gap in prior research by providing an account of a culture of technology production. Second, it proposes the analytical lens of "making subjectivities" to open up the concept of the netizen, illustrating the importance for Chinese Internet research to consider not only technology use, but also the culture and materials of its production. Third, it demonstrates that makers alter the system from within, contributing to our understanding of the relationship between technology use, production, society, activism and the state.
Today, we find ourselves in the middle of a new hacker culture (or "maker culture") that both harkens back to this model of technology production as individual empowerment and departs from it in significant ways. This contemporary maker culture is concerned not only with open Internet technology and digital things, but also with physical things such as hardware designs, sensors, and networking devices that bridge between the digital and physical world. While the earlier movement was concerned with the workings of software code and the workings of the Internet, this contemporary maker movement is also concerned with hardware designs and the workings of the Internet of things (IOT) 3 . Chris , the former editor in chief of Wired magazine, suggests that this contemporary "maker movement" is driving forward the "third industrial revolution" 4 -a generation of technology producers that expands from the earlier Internet and Web 2.0 techniques to make innovative products and remake industrial production. In this paper, I explore the unique manifestations of this maker movement in China. The two main questions I set out to explore are: how do maker ideals of individual empowerment and open knowledge production unfold in relation to China's politico-economic project of building a creative society? What can a study of a culture of technology producers tell us about the relationship between identity, collectivity and digital technology in China?
I begin to tackle these questions by centering in on debates over creativity in China such as its supposed lack and/or the opportunities that lie in its nurturing. For instance, politicians argue that Chinese citizens lack creativity and that as a consequence China lags behind in international comparison in terms of innovation output. In contrast, scholars in the field of Chinese Internet research found that individual and creative expression flourish online 5 . Their work has contributed important insights to our understanding of the Chinese Internet as multi-faceted and as a site through which simultaneously social norms are reworked and existing control is further extended. However, much of this prior work has focused on political issues, including, for instance, censorship and political control 6 , online activism, the public sphere and tactics to circumvent censorship 7 , as well as on disadvantaged populations with limited access to Internet technology or technological work-arounds such as migrant workers 8 . With the notable exceptions of Andrew 9 detailed account of white-collar workers in the high-tech industries in China and Taiwan and Lorraine Justice's (2012) 10 work on contemporary Chinese product design, the experiences and practices of those who work in the high-tech and creative industries in China today have received less attention. Especially rare in the growing field of Chinese Internet Research is work that involves longterm, on the ground ethnographic engagement with people involved in the creation and design of technologies. With my research on DIY making, I hope to begin fill this gap by providing exactly such an in-depth account of a culture of technology producers. It is important to note, here, that my goal is not to predict, "if DIY making is really going to make a big difference" for China's project of creativity, as one of the reviewers of this article challenged me to articulate. Rather, I provide a situated account of a unique moment of industry and social development in China, as new alliances between makers and established industries are established. The goal is not to speculate whether or not this "is going to make a difference" (a question to be answered in historical retrospect), but to illustrate how makers in China today are both messing with and extending the status-quo.
Making Subjectivities
An important analytical category deployed in the broader field of Chinese Internet Research to describe the relationship between individual expressions, collective identity and digital technology in China is the notion of the netizen. It is predominantly understood as a new form of citizen engagement enabled by the increase of Internet technologies and proliferation of access in China 11 . The perspective of the netizen has allowed us, for instance, to account for new forms of individual and collective expression, in particular in regards to political debates. It has lead to important insights about playful approaches towards censorship and creative workarounds 12 , and has uncovered the many shapes of contentious activities and activism associated with the use of the Internet 13 . This idea that Internet technologies in China, despite censorship, contribute to the empowerment of citizens (when they act as netizens) has been taken up widely beyond the field of Chinese Internet research, for instance in communication studies and popular tech discourse. Most of this work has approached the notion of the netizen through the lens of technology use. However, we know relatively little about the production of digital technology in China and its role for individual and collective expression. In this article, I argue for opening up the concept of the netizen to include practices of both use and production of technology. As China's technology landscape is changing, so is participation in its production changing. Think, for instance, of social networking applications such as Weibo and Weixin that have enabled new forms individual and collective as well as new measures of control. These platforms are shaped significantly both by user and system developers, designers and content managers. Opening up our focus towards technology production, then, provides new insights into how netizens are co-designing and co-producing the technologies they use.
For the purposes of this project of reopening the concept of the netizen, I bring together Chinese Internet research with work on dividual subjectivity in anthropology (Strathern 1988 , 1996 , Boellstorff 1997 . So far, the netizen has largely been understood as personhood enacted through technology use. This is based on the idea that the use of the Internet enables people to express themselves in new ways. While I consider it crucial to identify such emergent forms of expression and citizen engagement, the netizen as an analytical tool has in many ways turned into what anthropologist Marilyn Starthern (1988 Starthern ( , 1996 Strathern proposes the analytical lens of the "dividual" in order to account for the multiplicity of selfhood through which a person acts, positions herself, and makes meaning of others' actions. This concept has been taken up widely in both anthropology and digital media studies. For instance, building on Strathern, Boellstorff (1997) describes how the notion of the "flexible worker" in contemporary tech business and political rhetoric is exactly such a closed identity, predicated on a single selfhood, that Strathern describes 16 . Boellstorff urges not to re-inscribe dominant subject positions such as the flexible citizen, but to focus on how people make meaning out of tenuous, glancing, fragmentary, and half understood engagements. Building on this prior work, I propose the analytical sensitivity of "making subjectivities" to open up the notion of the netizen. Making subjectivities draws attention to the ways in which one's position in society is continuously in the making. It means paying attention to the work performed when we position ourselves in relation to others. It also acknowledges that our position is never singular and predicated on a single goal or purpose (e.g. to make money or to resist state control), but multiple, fractal, and heterogeneous. With making subjectivities, I wish to shift our focus from single identities such as the activist, the nationalist, the Internet users, and so on, to the multitude of a subject position. With making subjectivities, then, I point to prior research that has highlighted the diversity of technology use 17 and apply it to the study of technology production. As such, I do not propose a move away from what we have gained through our explorations of netizen practice, but to open up the concept of the netizen itself to include the many positions people craft for themselves and others, when they use and produce technology. In what follows, I illustrate how DIY makers in China understood technology production and starting-up tech businesses as intervening in the status-quo from within. By designing open technologies and developing new businesses, they repositioned themselves in relation to others. Their efforts were not directed at escaping the system, but at making use of it, making fun of it, altering it, and provoking it. In that sense, the subject positions they crafted were parasitic. With parasitic, I draw from Geremie Barme's use of term to resist common analytical binaries such as "the dominant social order" versus "subculture" or "counterculture" 18 . Providing a detailed historical account of China's 1980/90s avant-garde and pop art scene, Barme suggests recognize the mutual dependencies and alliances between artists and the state. Illustrating how the state leveraged dissident artists for claims over national cultural production and how artists in turn exploited state support, Barme argues that: nonofficial culture can also be spoken of as a parallel or even parasitic culture. As such, it is neither nonofficial nor necessarily anti official. Much of it was and still is produced with state funding and certain (often low-level) official or state involvement. It may not be directly sanctioned or beholden to the overculture, and it cannot simply be classified as oppositional 19 .
China's DIY maker culture is neither straightforward countercultural nor pro-system. DIY makers align with start-up culture and hackerspaces in the US, do not hesitate to take advantage of foreign venture capital 20 , and exploit political promotions of China's remake into a creative economy. They bring together and align often contradictory ideas such as copycat and open source, manufacturing and DIY, individual empowerment and collective change; and in doing so craft a particular kind of subject position for themselves and others in China.
DIY Making & Creativity in China
China's maker culture emerges from a growing network of hackerspaces, i.e. physical spaces that expand ideas and practices of the Web generation into hardware and manufacturing. Hackerspaces are community spaces created by people committed to new approaches towards technology use and design, based on the open sharing of software code and hardware designs. A typical space is equipped with computing tools that allow for experimenting with the physical/digital boundary -computer controlled laser cutters, 3-D printers, and microcontroller kits. Hackerspaces also often host educational workshops, where these tools are used to teach others about manipulating the physical environment through software, or vice versa.
China with corporate culture, and how it plays out in China, that this article sets out to explore. Just one year after the founding of XinCheJian, the Chinese government announced a call for proposals to build 100 "innovation houses" to be supported by government funding. Although the official document 28 described this initiative as part of a larger effort to build a citywide platform for supporting popular science work and innovation, national and international media interpreted this move as an endorsement of China's fledgling hackerspace community. What is going on here? How do DIY makers and Communist politicians come together in their believe that hackerspaces are the way of the future for creativity and innovation in China?
In popular discourse, when it comes to elaborating on the meaning of creativity, the quintessential example commonly used is Silicon Valley tech entrepreneurialism and start-up culture. Silicon Valley has not only produced technologies we all use today-think of applications like Firefox or Microsoft Word that you might be using to read this article-but also a particular way of thinking about what counts as innovation, good design and creativity 29 . China on the other hand is often invoked as Silicon Valley's unimaginative counterpart. Silicon Valley comes up with the ideas and China manufactures them. Apple products, for instance, are labeled as "designed in" California and "assembled in" China (see Figure 1 ).
Figure 1 Apple iPhone: designed by Apple in California Assembled in China
It is exactly this image that "assembled" or "made in" inherently refers to China and that "designed" or "created in" inherently refers to California that Chinese politicians are driven to remake, when they promote the cultivation of creativity. For example, in 2004, Liu Shifa from the Chinese Ministry of Culture, stressed that:
China should focus its attention on a new century. From creative industries to creative economy then to creative society. Contemporary China should be a creative China; from manufacturing to creative work, from "made in China" to "created in China"…" 30 .
By this, Liu Shifa suggested a transcendence of China's reliance on manufacturing (made in China) by re-directing economic and social development towards the creation of ideas, services and knowledge (created in China). Politicians and policy makers present this remake into a creative economy as the ultimate path to train a "quality" workforce that would enable China move ahead in a global market oriented towards knowledge production. Liu Shifa invoke an older discourse based on the principle that China's development rests on the development of a high-quality workforce 33 . In a book entitled "How Creativity is changing China," Li Wuwei (2011), one of China's leading policy makers, mirrors this larger discourse, promoting creativity as a new economic development strategy accomplished by the cultivation of a new society 34 . For China to become creative, Li Wuwei asserts, requires a remake of both its economy and its people. This call for creative development is exemplary of several official documents, by and large produced since China's entry into the WTO in 2001, drawing upon the idea that the world economy has reoriented from the production of materials to the production of immaterial goods, ideas, knowledge and services. The underlying tenor of these documents is that it is still the "low quality" of China's citizenry and the failure of Chinese people to modernize that holds the nation back from cultural leadership in international comparison. Wenming, when invoked in contemporary creativity discourse, attributes China's lack of creativity yet again to the failure of its people to modernize. However, the very meaning of "modernization" has shifted. "To be modern," now refers to a "disciplined" citizenry in China that should also embody virtues of globality such as entrepreneurial thinking, technological ingenuity and stature in international relations. Taken together, the cultivation of creativity is envisioned to lead to the necessary technological innovation and scientific advancements in China in order to turn the nation into both an economic and cultural leader on a global stage. Wenming is placed as the crucial piece at the heart of this process, casting China's future development as resting once again on its people.
In their call for societal change in order to cultivate creativity, Chinese politicians are not alone. They share this vision with politicians, policy makers and business leaders in other regions across Europe, North America and Asia, who have taken theories of the "post-industrial society" 39 , "knowledge economy" 40 and "creative class" 41 to their hearts. These theories, developed since the 1970s, have called forth a new class of workers such as the self-made entrepreneur, the flexible worker, the creator and innovator of technology. Prior research 42 has traced how political discourse and managerial literature across North America, Asia and Europe have taken up this idea in order to promote the training of tech-savvy, self-reliant and inventive citizens. These articulations call upon individuals to become creators of culture, technologies and profitable subjectivity.
The remainder of this article shows how China's makers simultaneously critique and relate to these calls for social change. They align with government officials, when they propose that innovation and creativity are crucial for China's development, however differ in how they envision this change to unfold. While politicians argue that creative industry development will make China into a cultural leader of the 21 st century, China's makers believe that individual empowerment and a bottom-up approach will lead to social and economic transformation. I will show that we cannot neither fully understand DIY maker culture nor IT development in China more broadly, if we neglect such parasitic alignments between seemingly opposing actors such as makers and politicians.
Fieldwork with makers
The work presented here is based on in-depth ethnographic research I have conducted with China's DIY maker scene since 2010. Its members understand DIY making as an orientation towards computing as creative expression and individual empowerment achieved by engaging with the inner workings of technology. They identify as members of a global "maker movement" 43 Their world, which I came to know through my ethnographic fieldwork is a fascinating one and one whose contours confound any simple generalization about China being a place where there is little or no creativity. Through my ethnographic research, I have become engaged as a close collaborator and co-producer in their cultural analysis, maker and business projects. As part of my research, I also accompanied them to events they helped organize or attended such as TEDx conferences, BarCamps, Dorkbots, Hackathons, Startup Weekends, creative industry conferences, Arduino workshops and Maker Faires. I participated in the event organization of some of these, as well as in the production of digital materials that unfolded at the hackerspaces on a daily basis 44 . In addition to participant observations and interviews with people affiliated with the DIY maker scene, I conducted archival research on policy documents on creative industry development, technological and urban development in China as well as interviews with other relevant stake holders such as urban planners, policy makers, founders of Chinese start-ups and international design firms.
Making as Individual Empowerment
For the people I worked with, DIY making meant, among other things, to utilize computational tools for creative expression and individual empowerment. Many shared a commitment to the open and free sharing of software code, hardware designs, ideas and resources, with the goal to reflect on and rework dominant social and economic frames. As in open source communities elsewhere, there is no single ideology or narrative that dominates the maker scene in China. Rather numerous and at times conflicting ideas and values animate them. Some people, for instance, are committed to starting up firms or grassroots communities, others are eager to rethink contemporary meanings of technology production through topics of re-use and open sharing while working for larger corporations, and yet others are driven to invent new organizational models or alternative approaches to the legal system. Anthropologists Gabriella Coleman and Alex Golub (2008) . It serves as a cultural meeting point and catalyst for a maker community that presents itself as acting globally and providing broadly the opportunity for people to exploit their creative capacities. The mission statement on the Maker Faire website, for instance, reads: "Maker Faire offers the opportunity for us to see ourselves as more than consumers; we are productive; we are creative. Everyone is a maker and our world is what we make it."
47 Although the Maker Carnival in Beijing was not officially supported by O'Reilly Media and as such could not be branded under the licensed name "Maker Faire," the event nevertheless was crucial for China's makers in demonstrating their belonging to the global "maker movement." Many of those who attended the Maker Carnival, no matter if Chinese or from abroad, told me that they believed that a maker approach towards creativity would place China at the center of global development today, or as one maker from San Francisco described it: "all of the world economy today is based on a creative economy. And if China is going to be part of this economy, people have to be able to take risks and be encouraged to be creative." In this call for social change, makers aligned with official rhetoric, arguing for the cultivation of a new creative society. They differed however in where they located China's lack. Many stressed that China lacked necessary infrastructures such as educational programs for children and youths, funding programs and independent organizations that support artists, entrepreneurs or generally anyone who works outside traditional frames and large institutions. They repeatedly emphasized that China's lack in international comparison was not due to the low quality of its people and lack of wenming as government officials argue, but was caused by the lack of such important infrastructures and support networks. This is how one of the co-founders of the coworking space XinDanWei put this once at a TEDx Shanghai event:
People say that Chinese have no creativity. That's bullshit! There are lots of very great ideas, some of them are almost too incredible to believe. We are not in shortage of people with good ideas. What we lack are the ability to execute, to extend and the power of influence and resources. Where can you get those things?... if there is a place where people can meet each other and contact all those resources, what will happen then?
Establishing a hackerspace in China, then, was in part motivated to address this lack and create a space that helps others in China think of new career paths (i.e. for instance, to become a freelance developer or designer, to start-up your own business, or simply to work with physical materials). During the first months of the Shanghai hackerspace XinCheJian, the co-founders organized a series of workshops to introduce others in China to maker culture and its commitments to creative play, DIY and open sharing. During one of the first workshops, the co-founders assembled participants around a big table that they had placed at the center of the hackerspace, introducing the tools they thought to be quintessential for any hackerspace: a 3D printer, Arduino boards, a laser cutter, some wires and electronic components, and soldering irons (see Figure 2) . Coming together around a Such introductory workshops provided resources also for the co-founders to identify what maker culture could mean in and for China. Many makers were particularly sensitive to the issue that a hackerspace could be associated with the image of heike ( hacker, black professional) engaged in illegal activity. As stories of Chinese hackers breaking into Google servers circulated widely in mass media outlets in 2010, the term heike became the widely used term to describe this practice of hacking into a system. And so many makers were anxious to come up with a term that did not have any immediate associations with heike or hacker. It was during the planning stages of the first international maker carnival in Beijing, when China's makers settled on an alternative term: 创客 (chuangke， creative professional). 创客 has the advantage of connoting creativity 创 意（chuangyi) and innovation 创新 (chuangxin), which are employed in positive terms within the wider creativity discourse, as elaborated earlier.
Through these early efforts, makers negotiated how to best position themselves and their work in China. XinCheJian, and the other hackerspaces and maker events that spun out of it, produced not only a wider imaginary of DIY making in China, but also with makers elsewhere. International attention brought with it legitimacy as well as access to a transnational network of like-minded tinkerers. More importantly though, the maker imaginary nourished a new subjectivity that existed simultaneously in relation to China's creativity discourse and in its opposition. While government officials argued that creativity would flourish through rather topdown creative cluster development 48 , Chinese makers urged that creativity was stimulated, when people follow a DIY mentality, guided by their own passions and working beyond rigid institutions and large corporations. DIY makers questioned one central pillar of creativity discourse in China -the stipulation of China's low quality citizenry -by reformulating ideals from another one, self-governance. Their businesses and daily work processes were centered around the idea that technology production can lead to individual empowerment and freedom of expression, ideas common to the free and open source software movement. Their businesses were targeted towards helping others in China to become creators not only of technologies, but also of a new position in society beyond rigid institutional frames and against a political rhetoric that renders citizens of low quality. This orientation towards computation as individual empowerment goes back to the early days of personal computing and the Internet 49 . Drawing upon Steven
Levy's writings on the "hacker ethic" 50 , Mimi Ito, for instance, describes how a group of computer enthusiasts at MIT in the early 1960s began to think about technology as open and modifiable by its users. Rather than the contemporary perceptions of the "hacker" as somebody engaged in unlawful activity breeching security leeks, this earlier approach towards technological "makings" evolved out of an "orientation toward the computer as a tool of empowerment and discovery" 51 .
In what follows, I elaborate how China's makers on the one hand identified with this idea of open technology production as individual empowerment, and on the other hand challenged what they believed to be a Western-centric interpretation of open-ness.
China's authentic maker culture
Many makers I worked with shared the belief that their work in China was uniquely positioned: at the heart of a pre-existing maker culture emergent from the hardware repair workshops on the streets and from factories that produce for the world. David Li, one of the cofounders of XinCheJian, often described this to me as an authentic maker culture, driven by necessity rather than countercultural ideals, which he associated with maker practice in the West. The last two years have seen a rise in hardware start-ups working with this manufacturing scene in China in order to turn their DIY maker ideas into consumer-end products. One of the regions central to this development is the Pearl River Delta in the South of China, and Shenzhen in particular, home to factories such as Foxconn that produce for companies like Apple and HP. Shenzhen has long been a particularly unique region in China; declared a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) upon its inception, it was designed and built with the goal to encourage foreign investment and economic growth. Foreign corporations, for instance, received tax reductions and other benefits when they opened a production site in the region. Today, Shenzhen also attracts a new generation of entrepreneurs; DIY makers, who described to me their experience of Shenzhen's downtown area electronic markets as "a life-size Digikey" and Shenzhen as a whole as "China's most open city." Many of the makers who started up businesses and moved to Shenzhen in order to manufacturer their products explained to me that the region's open-ness in manufacturing was central to its uniqueness.
What does open manufacturing as employed by makers mean? To begin answer this question, I first turn to the region's history of shanzhai (⼭山寨, copycat) production. Shanzhai traditionally stands for counterfeit products and low-quality copycat productions of well-known brands ranging all the way from retail such as Gucci bags to electronic products such as the iPhone. The literal translation into English is "mountain fortress" and carries connotations of self-reliance and resourcefulness. In this formulation, copying, re-use, and innovation are not mutually exclusive. For example, shanzhai factories in Shenzhen not only produce copies of the latest tablet or mobile phone. They also remix functional but discarded components with new parts in order to produce novel products, often tailored towards niche markets in China, India and Africa. Often-cited examples include mobile devices for Chinese migrant communities that allow users to send remittances easily, or phones with built-in compasses that point users in the direction of Mecca.
Makers referred to this second meaning of shanzhai when they described to me an efficient open manufacturing system that has formed around these small-scale factories in Shenzhen over the last 20 years. Open manufacturing means that many small factories, and in particular shanzhai factories, have informally organized a peer-to-peer database for sharing hardware design schematics and their bill of materials (BOM), a list of materials used in manufacturing a particular product. Sharing these resources allowed the factories to lower production costs and to stay competitive in a global market. Bunnie Huang, an acclaimed member of the international maker movement and regular visitor to Shenzhen, described shanzhai in a blog post as China's open source. Suggesting that the phenomenon has grown beyond the original shanzhai practice, he proposes the term gongkai to account for a "self-sustaining innovation ecosystem… just as the Galapagos Islands is a unique biological ecosystem evolved in the absence of continental species, gongkai is a unique innovation ecosystem evolved with little western influence, thanks to political, language, and cultural isolation" 52 .
Many other makers, similarly, foregrounded shanzhai's workings through open sharing and remix-as-innovation. Many also believed that by focusing on this unique open source culture the image of Chinese manufacturing can be revamped from a site of cheap, copycat production to one that highlights the more creative connotations shanzhai shares with the international maker movement. Let Seeed Studio is based on a business model that fruitfully merges maker ideals with China's manufacturing expertise. It works, because new ideas for products come out of strong partnerships with both Shenzhen's manufacturing world and DIY makers. For Eric, this notion of partnership is more than a business model, but about shaking up and remaking our very idea of manufacturing, innovation, and copy. This is best exemplified, when we take a closer look at the label of Seeed Studio products. For instance, rather than the common "made in China" tag that adorns most of the products we use on a daily basis, Seeed Studio's products are labeled as "innovate with China" (see Figure 3 ). "Innovate with China" illustrates the potential that lies in approaching China as a partner in the creation process rather than just a cheap producer. For Eric Pan, as for many other makers, shanzhai and the process of copy is better seen as a productive force, rather than as something inherently negative, or in his words:
shanzhai is… you learn from something and you are redoing it in your own way and it could be shabby at times, but also interesting at other…it's the same when you learn a new language. You have to write the sentence again and again, copying from your teacher. The shanzhai makers learn from their teachers like Apple and Samsung to create a mimic first. So they have the basic skills and develop the basic infrastructure to create. After you have learned how to write a word, a sentence, you remember it. From words you can create sentences and grammar, then you can write a whole article. You can develop your own style. It's a very natural process, it's the same with shanzhai production, it's nothing to be ashamed of or to be blamed for. It's a very important learning process. Similarly, many other makers considered shanzhai not as something negative or to be avoided. On the contrary, they often described it to me as a form of creativity and resourcefulness. Shanzhai stood for a form of ingenuity many considered intrinsically Chinese: a do-it-yourself mentality, inventive ways of working with materials, and adaptability to local shortages and rapid changes to the physical and social environment. By aligning shanzhai with DIY making, Seeed Studio repositions Chinese manufacturing, challenging dominant associations of "made in," cheap and low quality. It promotes a version of creativity that differs drastically from what the Chinese government has been promoting over the last years, as I laid out at the beginning of this paper; a move away from "made in" and China's reliance on manufacturing. Seeed Studio's products and processes demonstrate that the long-term manufacturing know-how with its unique open-source spirit could be the very seed for China's remake.
Conclusion
In this paper, I have shown how China's DIY makers are remaking industrial production, common understandings of innovation and creativity, and in doing so craft a subject position beyond the common rhetoric of Chinese citizens lacking creativity. I have also shown that makers believe that technological innovation and social change can be enabled by setting up physical spaces such as hackerspaces and/or starting hardware businesses as interfaces between a wider public, potential investors, like-minded makers, Chinese manufacturing and officials. What drives their open approach towards technology production is the believe that it will lead not only to new forms of innovation, but also to individual empowerment in a climate of rapid change on a global scale.
Throughout the paper, I develop the analytical lens of "making subjectivities" to illustrate that the social meaning of technology in China is shaped by technology use and production. Makers are promoting the importance of a maker approach for China's future development. However, to be a maker was not understood in distinction from other aspects of their lives. Rather DIY making was not only a mode of technology production, but also a way of being and acting in the world through which other aspects of life were tackled. For instance, being a maker did not mean that one couldn't be a parent, rather it meant being a parent differently, committed to teach one's child to act in the world in a hands-on and engaged manner. Similarly, being a maker was not perceived in distinction from being an entrepreneur, designer, programmer, engineer, artist, geek, blogger, citizen, or netizen, and so on. Identifying as a maker meant constructing a multifaceted position in society that exists in relation to many other spheres of life. Entering partnerships between diverse stakeholders, the makers I worked with positioned themselves in a world they perceive as in flux. They refused to be caught up in urban, economic, technological and social transformation in China. DIY making as a mode of living and working was central to this refusal. As the site of individual empowerment within unstable and shifting worlds, DIY making enabled my interlocutors to remake the very societal norms and material infrastructures that undergird their work and livelihood. Their technology productions and businesses were neither straightforward countercultural nor pro-system. In order to account for these at times symbiotic, at other times parasitic practices, analytical categories such as tactics versus strategies, state (or corporation) versus netizen, or official versus counterculture are clearly insufficient. For instance, I have shown in this article how Seeed Studio simultaneously appropriates and remakes industrial production in China and international ideas of creativity and innovation. Members of hackerspaces in their formulations of creativity both align with and critique official discourse.
The lens of making subjectivities allows us to see how people actively craft a position for themselves and others, and how this process is neither just resistance nor just acceptance of the status-quo, but a continuous play at the borders in between.
What I wish to emphasize, finally, is the importance for researchers of Chinese Internet and technology to reflect on our own form of participation in both the use and design of technologies in China. Speaking of netizens as the other, ontological category out there for us to observe, that we should speak for (or about) as scholars and researchers, separates "us" or "the observer" from the practices we study. Taking a position removed from the "network" we study is complicated by our position within the same technological and social infrastructures, or as Lisa Riles put it so poignantly, "We lack an outside today. We are all in the network." As politicians across regions are calling upon all of us (technology producers, educators and researchers alike) to become creators of innovation, flexible and innovative workers, it is ever more important to understand how people craft positions in relation to this discourse and how they partially resist and exploit it. DIY makers exemplify this process, as they embed themselves in (and simultaneously challenge) political and market processes directed at involving all of us as potential producers of things, economies, and knowledge.
Notes

